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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate whether a relaxation in seniority rules (the ‘last-in-first-out’ 
principle) had any effect on firms’ employment behaviour. Seniority rules exist in sev-
eral countries and, like Sweden, most European countries have a more lenient employ-
ment protection for firms below a certain size. Despite the fact that small firms repre-
sent a large share of all firms and stand for a substantial share of total employment, 
there is limited knowledge of how such exemption rules affect firms’ employment 
behaviour — the consequences of seniority rules on firms’ employment behaviour have 
not been examined at all. Using data including the population of firms matched with the 
population of workers for the period 1999–2002, we do not find any general effects on 
worker flows or on hires and separations. The only exception is a tendency of an 
increase in the share of separations for older workers and workers with longer seniority. 
The result points to the importance of considering in detail how legislation is formulated 
and how it works in practice. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper empirically investigates how employment protection affects firms’ employ-
ment behaviour. How employment protection affects the labour market functioning is a 
controversial subject (see e.g., OECD, 2004). The main motivation for employment 
protection is to protect workers from unfair dismissals. Employment protection is also a 
welfare arrangement that provides economic security to workers, ultimately increasing 
the value of work. Opponents against strong employment protection argue that more 
lenient protection would improve the efficiency of the labour market. How employment 
protection affects firms’ employment behaviour is vital to the design of policy and to 
the understanding of labour market behaviour.  
Previous empirical research often relies on cross-country variation by correlating 
some strictness index measure of employment protection with the employment level. 
One major challenge with cross-country studies is to obtain comparable measures of 
strictness, since legislation varies widely across countries (see e.g., discussion in Howell 
et al., 2007; Kugler 2007). We therefore argue that it is important to evaluate certain 
aspects of the employment protection legislation. One such aspect is seniority rules, 
which protect workers with long seniority. Seniority rules exist in several countries 
(OECD, 2003). In France, Italy, Mexico and the Netherlands, the law stipulates some 
kind of seniority-based rules regarding dismissals. In Finland and the US, seniority rules 
are often laid down in collective agreements. In Norway and the UK, seniority rules are 
not stipulated by law or laid down by collective agreement but often used as an accepted 
custom. In the Netherlands and in Sweden the seniority rule is formulated as a ‘last-in-
first-out’ (LIFO) principle. In Sweden this LIFO principle is one main cornerstone in 
the Swedish Employment Protection Act (EPA, Lagen om anställningsskydd, SFS 
1982:80, 22 §). The principle states that the worker who was employed last has to go 
first when a firm downsizes. The LIFO principle was reformed in January 2001 so that 
employers with ten or fewer employees were allowed to exempt two workers from the 
seniority rule. 4  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
Like Sweden, most European countries have a more lenient employment protection for 
firms below a certain size. For example, workers in France at firms with fewer than ten 
employees are less protected against layoffs. In Italy, workers in firms with fewer than 
16 employees are less protected. In Spain, redundancy payments are lower for firms 
with fewer than 25 employees. Despite the fact that small firms represent a substantial 
share of all firms and stand for a large share of total employment, there is limited know-
ledge how such exemption rules affect firms’ employment behaviour.
1 Moreover, the 
consequences of seniority rules on firms’ employment behaviour have not been exam-
ined at all. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate whether the exemption rule, which implied 
that firms with ten or fewer employees could exempt two workers from the last-in-first-
out principle, had any effects on firm’s employment behaviour. Theory suggests that 
less protection – the exemption rule in this case – increases worker flows through 
increased hires and separations. The exemption rule may also induce firms to engage in 
strategic behaviour to avoid these institutional constraints. Therefore, we will first in-
vestigate whether firms engaged in such strategic behaviour in order to be allowed to 
use the exemption rule. Next, we analyse the effects of the exemption rules on workers 
flows. 
We use data including the population of firms matched with the population of 
workers for the period 1999–2002. Worker flows are measured at a monthly basis. The 
break in the policy for firms of size ten provides a natural setting for analysing the 
impact of the exemption rule using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach. The key 
advantage of this approach is that it provides estimates that are ‘as credible as those 
from a randomized experiment’ (Lee 2008) under relatively weak conditions.
2 The rea-
son is that we do not study a reform per se, but a discontinuity present in a static policy. 
In this paper, this means that we compare employment behaviour between firms with 
ten and eleven employees. As such, we do not have to rely on any assumptions about 
                                                 
1 The overall evidence from the few existing studies suggest very small effects (Bauer et al. 2007; Borgarello et al. 
2004; Schivardi and Torrini 2004; Verick 2004. See also the empirical overview in Section 2. 
2 The regression discontinuity approach has recently become increasingly popular in economics because of the rather 
weak identifying assumptions. For an overview of the regression discontinuity design and recent studies, see Imbens 
and Lemieux (2008).  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  5 
the comparability of the outcome development for the treated and the control group, 
which is the case when using the differences-in-difference (DD) approach.
3 However, 
we will also apply the DD estimator as a complementary analysis, and in addition use 
this approach in order to examine whether there are any differential effects by firm size. 
The paper contributes to the literature on employment protection and firms’ employ-
ment behaviour by focusing on the effect of a seniority rule on firms’ strategic behave-
iour and on workers flows.
4 Moreover, knowledge of how exemption rules in general 
affect firms’ employment behaviour is rare. Furthermore, previous studies often rely on 
small and un-representative data sets (see Schivardi and Torrini, 2004). This makes it 
difficult to generalise from results and it is not always clear whether non-robust results 
are due to insignificant effects or due to a small number of observations. This is not the 
case in our paper since we have access to data on the whole population of firms and 
workers. 
Results show that the exemption rule had no effect at all on the size distribution of 
firms and we do not find any general effects on worker flows. The only exception is a 
tendency of an increase in the share of separations for older workers and workers with 
longer seniority, but these effects are not robust to how standard errors are calculated, 
and the effects are small in economic terms. The result is interesting not only because it 
is the first paper evaluating the consequences of the LIFO principle on firms’ employ-
ment behaviour, but it also points to the importance of considering in detail how legis-
lation is formulated and how it works in practice. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an 
overview of the theory and empirical literature on worker flows. Section 3 describes the 
employment protections legislation and the LIFO principle in Sweden. Data and the 
empirical strategy are outlined in Section 4. Results based on a graphical analysis are 
presented in Section 5, and econometric results are presented in Section 6. Discussion 
and conclusions are given in Section 7. 
                                                 
3 The commonly used difference-in-differences estimator has been found to perform poorly with inappropriately 
chosen control groups (see e.g., Lemieux and Milligan 2008).  
4 Two previous studies using the LIFO reform in January 2001 found that individual sick reporting increased at firms 
which could exempt two workers from the seniority rule (see Lindbeck et al., 2006; Olsson, 2008). 6  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
2  Theory and empirical literature on worker 
flows 
2.1 Theoretical  prediction on worker flows 
Theory predicts effects of employment protection on a wide range of outcomes such as 
employment, employment volatility, productivity, wages, GDP growth, innovations, etc. 
The brief overview below will focus solely on the theoretical predictions of dismissal 
costs on workers flows.  Legislation often states that a layoff must be based on objective 
grounds and the criteria for objective grounds are formulated in the legislation. Dismiss-
al legislation also includes other more direct costs for layoffs such as redundancy pay, 
notice periods and seniority rules, which restrict the employers’ influence over whom to 
lay off. 
Lay-off costs are often modelled as a tax on layoffs. Lazear (1990) argues that such 
taxes can be avoided by an efficient labour contract where an ex ante transfer – such as 
a wage reduction – is made from the worker to the employer. In practice, however, with 
imperfect labour markets and rigid wages (including minimum wages and wages set by 
collective agreements), dismissal legislation will impose adjustment costs for the 
employer. As such, theory predicts that lay-off protection decreases hires as well as 
separations. Since fewer workers are hired, this reduces the exit rate from unemploy-
ment. At the same time, fewer workers enter unemployment through reduced separa-
tions. Taken together, the net effect on the employment level (or unemployment) is 
therefore a priori ambiguous. The predicted effect on worker flows, on the other hand, 
is unambiguously negative. 
Theory also predicts that dismissal protections have differential effects on different 
groups of workers (Bertola et al., 2008). Redundancy pay and notice periods often 
increase with seniority, which means higher lay off costs for workers with longer 
seniority such as older workers. For workers with lower attachment to the labour market 
such as young, immigrant, female and disabled workers it may be difficult to verify 
their productivity. For example, it might be more difficult to assess productivity of 
younger workers with little labour market experience; employers might find it difficult 
to evaluate degrees taken in other countries; employers might be more uncertain about IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  7 
women’s presence at work since they, on average, have longer periods with parental 
leave and higher sickness absence on average than men. Workers with more uncertain 
productivity have smaller chances of being hired if risk averse employers see them as a 
more risky investment. Taken together, the exemption rule might improve employment 
opportunities for younger, female and foreign born workers. For older workers, the 
exemption rule might instead increase separations.  
Adjustment costs such as seniority rules also induce firms to engage in strategic 
behaviour to avoid these institutional constraints. If exemption is possible on the basis 
of a threshold scale, firms could split into formally independent units. Smaller firms 
could stop growing (Schivardi and Torrini, 2004). Employment protection legislation 
also affects the entry and exit probabilities of firms (i.e., the extensive margin). If fewer 
firms enter and more firms close due to employment protections, the employment level 
will decrease. 
Theory also predicts positive effects of employment protections. Besides protecting 
workers from unfair dismissals, it is often argued that the main purpose of dismissal 
protection is to protect workers from income fluctuations generated by job losses. This 
is the insurance argument for employment protection, where insurance improves worker 
welfare. The reason why legislation is required to provide insurance is analogous to the 
argument in favour of for example social insurance – insurance markets affected by 
moral hazard and adverse selection do not provide sufficient coverage (Pissarides, 
2001). Furthermore, employment protection might also improve the employer–
employee relationship (motivation, willingness to co-operate etc.), which in turn could 
enhance productivity. Dismissal protection might also raise worker productivity due to 
improved training incentives, both from the employer as well as on the work side, 
which increase human capital (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).  
2.2 Empirical  literature on worker flows 
Empirical evidence on the impact of employment protection on the employment level 
and worker flows does not clearly support the theoretical predictions (see surveys by 
Addison and Teixeira, 2005, and Kugler, 2007). A vast majority of the empirical litera-
ture follows Lazear (1990) in exploiting cross-country variation in index values for the 
strictness of employment protection legislation. The only robust empirical finding in 8  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
this literature is that more strict employment protection reduces flows into and out of 
unemployment. The results concerning aggregate employment are not robust – estima-
ted effects point in different directions. A number of studies, however, suggest that 
dismissal protection reduces employment and increases unemployment for younger 
workers and in some cases also female workers (see e.g., Bassani and Duval 2006; 
Bertola et al., 2008; Botero et al., 2004; Heckman and Pagés-Serra, 2000; Skedinger, 
1995).  
In addition to the problem of finding comparable measures of strictness across coun-
tries, cross-country studies suffer from other identification problems. It is difficult to 
handle other important differences than differences in legislations between countries 
which may help to explain the estimated relationship between employment protection 
and worker flows. Some of the aggregated studies therefore exploit time variation 
within countries. However, employment protection usually shows very little variation 
over time. It is also the case that fluctuations in employment and the unemployment rate 
might cause changes in the legislation, making employment protection endogenous due 
to reversed causality. 
In recent years there have been an increasing number of studies examining the im-
pact of employment protection at the firm or worker level. These studies either exploit 
reforms that change the dismissal legislation for firms under a certain number of 
workers, or changes in legislation that occur at different points in time across regions. 
Kugler and Pica (2008) exploit a reform in Italy where firms below size fifteen were 
exempted from legislation prior to 1990 but were subject to the legislation from that 
year. According to their results, worker flows decreased for smaller firms relative to 
large firms when they were subject to the legislation. Kugler (2004), exploiting a reform 
in Colombia, found that the flows in and out of unemployment increased when 
employment protection was more liberal. Results from Autor et al. (2007) support this 
finding. Based on US data they show that worker flows decreased in states that 
implemented a stricter employment protection than the so-called employment-at-will 
principle. There are exceptions to these results, however. Martins (2007) found no 
effects on worker flows when studying a reform in Portugal in 1989, where firms with 
at most twenty workers get more lenient protection legislation. Germany changed their IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  9 
dismissal legalisation at two times during the 1990s. Until 1996, firms with five or 
fewer workers had more lenient protection legislation. In 1996, this exemption was 
extended to firms with at most ten workers. In 1999, the threshold of five workers was 
re-introduced.  German studies exploiting these reforms find no or very small effects on 
worker flow (see Bauer et al., 2007). 
Taken together, results exploiting reforms using micro-data in different countries in 
order to estimate effects on worker flows are mixed. It should be emphasized, however, 
that it is not always straightforward to compare results from different countries as it is in 
general difficult to calculate how the reform really changed the costs for firms. If 
changes in firms' adjustment costs are small it is reasonable to find small reform effects. 
As regards studies focusing on effects on the employment level results are mixed. 
Some studies show that stricter employment protection reduces the employment level 
(see e.g., studies by Autor et al. (2004, 2006) on US data; Kugler et al. (2003) who use 
data from Spain; Martins (2007) who uses data from Portugal; and Schivardi and 
Torrini (2008) using data from Italy). Miles (2000), on the other hand, show no 
employment effects using data for the US. Autor et al. (2007) find positive effects for 
the US and a German study by Verick (2004) also shows positive effects. 
Some studies focus more directly on the estimation of threshold effects when firms 
of different sizes have different degrees of employment protection. This question is 
closely related to our paper since we will examine the consequences of the relaxation of 
the LIFO principle, which was introduced in 2001 for firms below the size on eleven. 
Along this dimension, Borgarello et al. (2004) and Schivardi and Torrini (2004), using 
different empirical datasets and estimation strategies, analyse threshold effects resulting 
from the exemption threshold in Italian employment protection legislation. Overall, 
their evidence suggests that if there is an effect of the exemption threshold on the size 
distribution of firms, it is probably very small. In a similar study for Spain, Boeri and 
Jimeno (2005) observe that lay-off probabilities for workers in firms exempted through 
a threshold scale are higher than those of workers in firms covered by employment 
protection legislation. As for Germany, Verick (2004) finds a slightly lower probability 
of employment growth for firms just under the threshold, when the threshold was 
tightened through the change in the German dismissal protection legislation. 10  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
3  Employment protection and LIFO in Sweden 
The 1982 Employment Protection Act (EPA) stipulates that the default type of employ-
ment contract is a permanent contract. Fixed-term contracts are allowed if warranted by 
the nature of the work to be done, and probation periods of up to six months are allowed 
in connection with permanent contracts. Workers may be fired for gross misconduct, or 
they may be laid off, either because of ‘shortage of work’ or due to reasons pertaining to 
the worker personally. The latter is rarely used in practice, and instead it is ‘shortage of 
work’ that is the principal justification for laying off workers in most cases. A newly 
employed worker has a minimum notice period of one month, and this increases by one 
additional month for every two years of tenure, up to a maximum of six months’ notice 
after ten years of tenure. When a firm decides to downsize, i.e., to lay-off employees 
due to ‘shortage of work’, it cannot pick and choose at will, but must follow the LIFO 
principle – in other words, if downsizing by n employees, it is the n workers who most 
recently joined the firm that must be laid off. In addition, an employee who has been 
laid off due to ‘shortage of work’ has priority in reemployment for nine months 
following layoff (subject to having worked at least 12 months with the firm). 
Several provisions in the EPA make the LIFO principle less stringent than what a 
first impression suggests. First, if the firm is bound by collective agreements, the 
workforce should be divided into groups based on their trade union affiliation, and the 
LIFO principle then applies to each such group separately. Most important, however, is 
that collective agreements often stipulates that the employer and the union can negotiate 
about even stricter divisions of worker groups based on ‘similar work tasks’. It is also 
the case that the law explicitly states that an individual who is redundant with respect to 
his current work tasks, must be qualified enough for alternative tasks – whether this is 
the case is at the discretion of the employer.
 In particular, this last provision implies the 
following. Suppose a firm has ‘shortage of work’ with respect to task X, but not to task 
Y. Worker A is the one with shortest seniority performing task X, and worker B is the 
worker with shortest seniority performing task Y. In general, the firm should lay off 
worker B in this case, shifting worker A from task X to task Y – but the employer can IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  11 
still lay off worker A if he is judged not to be qualified enough for task X (Wil-
helmsson, 2001, p. 4). 
Second, the share of temporary contracts has increased substantially during the last 
ten-year period. Thus, the employer has the possibility to screen new workers for a 
significant period of time, which makes hiring less risky. 
A change in the EPA provision regarding the LIFO principle entered into force on 1 
January 2001. After the reform, firms with 10 or fewer employees are allowed to 
exempt two workers from LIFO considerations, i.e., it can assign ‘key worker’ status to 
two individuals, who will then escape layoff even if they ought to have been the one to 
go if LIFO were followed strictly. 
The chronology of the implementation of the reform is outlined in Lindbeck et al. 
(2006). Their Table 1 makes it clear that it is not likely that the reform was anticipated 
by actors in the labour market to any great extent – the reform was initiated and 
implemented against the will of the Social Democratic government, through a coalition 
between the liberal-conservative opposition and the Green Party, and it was unclear 
until late in 2000 exactly which firms would be eligible for this loosening of the LIFO 
requirement. 
4  Data and empirical strategy 
In this paper we use data at the firm-month level. Our data comes from the IFAU data-
base, which consists of several data sets; one is the LOUISE from Statistics Sweden, 
which includes register information on the population aged 16–65 during the period 
1985–2004. The IFAU database also includes the Employment register with yearly 
information on all Swedish firms, containing monthly start and end dates of all 
employments, along with identifiers for employers and employees.
5 From these data 
sets we can construct measures on the employment stock as well as on worker flows 
                                                 
5 The phrase ‘monthly start and end dates of all employments’ should be understood as follows: within each yearly 
Employment register dataset, each employment is identified with its start and end months within the year. If the 
employment was continued from the preceding year, and continued into the following year, start and end months will 
be given as January and December respectively. Hence we can trace employments, and construct seniority measures, 
back to 1995 only, which is when the first Employment register data becomes available. 12  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
(i.e., hires and separations) for all firms on a monthly basis. By defining data on a 
monthly basis we measure the size of the firm with high precision, which is important in 
this paper since we want to distinguish between firms with ten and eleven employees. 
When determining the size of a firm’s work force in connection with a shortage-of-
work situation, all employees are given the weight of 1 (e.g., part-time workers, 
temporary workers etc.).
6 Employees who have a ‘managerial position’ should not be 
counted when defining the size of a firm’s work force. We cannot identify which 
employees are managers, but we take this issue into account when constructing firm 
size figures in the following manner. Some 12 percent of firms in our sample have one 
or several ‘entrepreneurs’ associated with them. These ‘entrepreneurs’ are available in 
our data, and are never counted as employees. For firms with one or more ‘entrepre-
neurs’, we define firm size simply as the total number of employees in each month. For 
firms with no ‘entrepreneurs’, we argue that at least one of the employees must act as a 
manager; hence we reduce the baseline monthly firm size figure by one for all these 
firms. 
Thanks to the individual register we also have information on the age, gender and 
country of birth for all worker flows. Moreover, since the Employment register is 
available to us back to 1995 we can trace whether workers have been employed in the 
same firm since that year (see also footnote 6). Thus, we can construct a measure of 
worker seniority which in 1999 is censored at 48 months. We restrict the population of 
firms used in the analysis to firms with 2–20 employees, whereof around 91 percent 
belong to the private sector. The analysis is further restricted to workers aged 18–64. 
The sample period used is 1999–2002. There is no information in the data on whether 
the employment contract is on a temporary or a permanent basis. This is not a problem 
when defining the firm size since the EPA stipulates that all types of contracts should be 
taken into account when defining firm size. Note, however, the seniority rule is only 
relevant for workers on permanent contracts. Furthermore, the seniority rule is only of 
importance when separations are involuntary, but in the data we cannot separate 
whether separations are voluntary, fires, or lay offs. It is therefore possible that 
                                                 
6 A couple of other narrowly defined groups are also excluded in the workforce count; see SFS 1982:80 for details. IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  13 
voluntary separations to some extent disguise effects of the exemption rule. In a 
sensitivity analysis we will investigate this issue by only looking at small firms with at 
least three separations in a month. Since three separations in a month is a relatively 
unusual event – 3 percent of the sample – we argue that these separations consist of a 
larger share of involuntary separations. As an alternative we also look at observations 
where the difference between the number of separations and hires is at least two. 
Theory predicts that a relaxation of employment protection will increase worker 
flows through increased hires and separations. Therefore, as a first outcome measure we 
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where Eit is the employment level for firm i in month t. Since firms are of different sizes 
it is important to normalize with respect to the employment level, here defined as the 
average employment level for the two months. We also analyse new hires and 
separations separately. We will use the share of new hires and the share of separations 
defined as the fraction of new hires (separations) to the firm size on a monthly basis.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for firms across firm sizes. 
Table 1. Mean characteristics by firm size 1999–2001. 
Firm size  2 3  4  5  6  7   
No. of firms.  42,907  25,696  18,760  14,472  11,545  9,617   
Absolute empl. Change   0.108  0.087  0.078  0.071  0.065  0.061   
Share new hires   0.060  0.056  0.054  0.052  0.050  0.048   
Share separations  0.056  0.052  0.050  0.048  0.047  0.046   
              
Firm size  8 9 10 11  12 13  
No. of firms.  7,984  6,590  5,503  4,579  3,855  3,300   
Absolute empl. change  0.059  0.057  0.056  0.055  0.054  0.053   
Share new hires   0.048  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.047   
Share separations  0.045  0.045  0.045  0.045  0.045  0.045   
              
Firm size  14 15  16  17 18  19  20 
No. of firms  2,784  2,456  2,190  1,877  1,696  1,562  1,348 
Absolute empl. change  0.055  0.053  0.053  0.052  0.052  0.051  0.050 
Share new hires   0.048  0.048  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047 
Share separations  0.045  0.045  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.045 14  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
The empirical strategy outlined is straightforward. We will start with a graphical analy-
sis in Section 5 where we first show whether firms engaged in strategic behaviour in 
order to use the exemption rule. This would happen if firms with more than ten 
employees downsized in order to use this rule; or if firms with ten or fewer employees 
avoided expanding their workforce above the threshold of ten. Threshold effects also 
exist if newly created firms were systematically below the size of ten in order to use the 
exemption rule, i.e. threshold effects at the extensive margin. McCrary (2008) suggests 
a test of whether subjects under study manipulate the forcing variable determining 
treatment – i.e. firm size in our case. 
The principle of this test is to estimate the distribution of the forcing variable and 
look for a discontinuous break around the cut-off (i.e., between firm sizes ten and 
eleven). Since firm size is a discrete variable, there may be discrete breaks in the 
distribution even if firm size were not manipulated. Our solution to this problem is to 
compare the firm size distribution when the exemption rule was in force (2001–2002) 
with the corresponding distribution before the exemption rule took place (1999–2000). 
If the two firm size distributions (before and after the reform) are equal, this indicates an 
absence of any threshold effects. 
To further examine whether firms adjusted their size in order to use the exemption 
rule, we also analyse growth dynamics by firm size. If the exemption rule makes it less 
expensive to lay off workers, future lay-off costs would rise if a firm of size ten hires 
one additional worker compared to the case when a firm of size eleven hires one 
additional worker. For this reason, we would expect firms just below the threshold to be 
less likely to grow compared to other firms, i.e. firms at and above the threshold of 
eleven as well as firms smaller than ten. As regards the probability of downsizing, the 
theoretical predictions are less clear-cut. Firms just above the threshold have higher 
firing costs which might imply fewer incentives to downsize compared to a firm of size 
ten or smaller. At the same time, firms of sizes above ten would at have incentives to 
reduce their work force in order to use the exemption rule. Knowledge of whether firms 
engaged in strategic behaviour is crucial because in absence of such type of behaviour it 
is straightforward to compare employment behaviour between firms around the 
threshold i.e., firms of sizes ten and eleven. Next, we continue with a graphical analysis IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  15 
showing average worker flow measures by firm size and look for breaks between firms 
of sizes ten and eleven. 
After the graphical analysis we estimate the quantitative effects of the exemption rule 
in Section 6 and establish to what extent the effects are statistically different from zero. 
We use the regression discontinuity (RD) approach, which basically means that we 
estimate whether there is a significant break in these worker flow measures between 
firms of sizes ten and eleven. The key assumption here, given that firms did not 
manipulate their size in order to benefit from the exemption rule, is that firms of sizes 
ten and eleven are statistically equal in all other respects, except for the fact that firms 
of size ten can exempt two workers from the LIFO principle but firms of size eleven can 
not. The advantage of this approach is that it provides estimates that are ‘as credible as 
those from a randomized experiment’ (Lee, 2008) under this assumption. 
Using the RD approach means that we can only compare effects based on firms 
around the threshold implying that results can not be necessarily be generalised to all 
other firms. In fact, the exemption rule could have differential effects depending on the 
firm size. Choosing two ‘key workers’ provides more flexibility for a firm with three 
employees than for a firm with eight employees. If the firm with eight workers would 
like to lay off four workers, then the choice of the third and the fourth worker is as 
restricted as for a firm with more than 10 employees. Instead, the firm with three 
employees has no restrictions as it can choose the marginal worker it wants to fire 
assigning ‘key-worker’ status to the other two. 
To examine differential effects by firm size we also provide an analysis using a 
difference-in-differences (DD) analysis. Here we will use firm data at the quarterly level 
for the period 1999–2002, where a firm is defined as treated if average quarterly firm 
size is ten or below. The control group is firms with an average quarterly firm size 
above ten. We then estimate whether there is a significant change for small firms 
relative to large firms in the employment measures when the reform takes place in 2001. 
The key assumption is that small and large firms would have had parallel trends in the 
employment measures in absence of the reform. This will be carefully investigated by 
inspecting the development of the employment measures for small and large firms 
before the reform. This approach also allows us to estimate analogous effects but now 16  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
separately for each firm size. We will here use firms with sizes 16–20 as the control 
group. Each estimation approach will be more explicitly stated in the subsequent analy-
sis.  
5 Graphical  empirical  analysis 
5.1  Threshold effects of the exemption rule 
Figure 1 shows firm shares by size before and after the reform. Small firms constitute 
the majority of the sample population. More than one-half of the firms have fewer than 
five workers; firms with ten or eleven workers constitute around six percent. If firms 
manipulated their size or if new ‘small’ firms were created in order to use the exemption 
rule, we would expect to find a discrete break in the shares of firms between ten or 
eleven workers. However, the density function seems to be a smooth negative function 
of firm size without any unusual discrete breaks.  Moreover, the firm size distribution 
for the pre-reform period is remarkably equal to the distribution when the exemption 
rule was in force. This indicates that firms did not manipulate their size; nor were 
entering firms systematically of size ten or smaller.
7  
 
                                                 
7 Note that this conclusion also holds if we exclude the smallest firms of size two and three from the size distribution.   IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  17 
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Next, we analyse whether firms just below the threshold were less likely to grow 
compared to all other firms, and whether firms above the size of ten around the 
threshold had different probabilities of reducing their workforce. Figure 2 shows the 
probabilities of firm growth by initial firm size, before and after the LIFO reform. The 
probability of firm growth is defined as the fraction of firms that increased the size of 
their workforce (by any amount) from one month to another. In general, the probability 
of firm growth seems to increase with initial firm size.  However, no clear downward 
jump in the probability of growing is found at the threshold value of ten. The pattern of 
growth probability is also very similar to the corresponding pattern before the reform.  18  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
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Figure 3 shows the probability of downsizing by (initial) firm size. The probability of 
downsizing is defined analogously to the probability of firm growth, i.e. the fraction of 
firms reducing their workforce (by any amount) between two months. The probability 
of downsizing is positively related to the initial firm size, but we find no systematic 
distortion of a smooth relationship around the threshold. IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  19 
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Following Bauer et al. (2007), we have also tested whether there are any significant 
thresholds effects using the following regression model: 
 
(2) y i = α + f(Firm sizei) + ΣkλkD(Firm sizei = k) + εi, 
 
where yi is an indicator variable for whether the firm i has increased or reduced the 
work force, f(Firm sizei)  is some polynomial function of firm size and D(Firm sizei = k) 
is a set of indicator variables for sizes around the threshold. λk is supposed to capture 
any threshold effects provided that the function f(Firm sizei) fits the smooth relationship 
between the outcome measure and firm size. Results from estimations do not show any 
significant threshold effects (results are available from the authors). Taken together, the 
analyses above indicate that the relaxation of the LIFO principle had no impact on 
firms’ propensity to change their work force.  20  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
5.2  Effects on worker flows 
Although we find no evidence that firms tried to ‘manipulate’ the size of their work 
force, in order to fall or remain under the threshold level of ten employees, it is possible 
that worker flows were affected. Since firms demonstrably did not manipulate their 
workforce, it is straightforward to compare differences in employment behaviour 
between firms with ten and eleven employees during the period after the exemption rule 
entered into force (i.e., during 2001–2002). We will subsequently compare employment 
behaviour after the reform with the corresponding behaviour prior to the reform (i.e., in 
1999–2000), following the same logic as in the analysis of threshold effects above.  
Figure 4 shows the absolute month-to-month employment change, as defined by 
equation (1), separately before and after the reform and by firm size. In general, the 
absolute month-to-month employment change after the reform shows a negative 
relationship with firm size. However, no clear upward jump is found at the threshold 
value of ten. As such, employment volatility seems to be insensitive to whether firms 
can exempt two workers or not. This argument is also confirmed by inspection of the 
absolute employment change by firm size before the reform, which shows a remarkably 
equal pattern to the one after the reform.  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  21 
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If the exemption rule yielded an increase in new hires and separations of the same 
magnitude, this would not show up in the absolute employment change measure. For 
this reason we also analyse the changes in the shares of new hires and separations, 
separately, in the same way that we analysed the absolute employment change. Figure 5 
and 6 show the share of new hires and the share of separations by firm size, 
respectively. Figure 5 shows that there are no differences in the shares of hires between 
firms with ten or eleven employees. In fact, the shares of new hires and separations are 
fairly flat across all firm sizes (except for firms with two employees). The reason that 
the share of new hires is larger before the reform is due to an improvement in the 
business cycle at that period. As regards the share of separations, Figure 6 shows very 
small differences in the share of separations for firms of adjacent sizes. If anything, the 
share of separations is slightly higher for firms of size ten compared to firms of size 
eleven, which is consistent what we would have expected according to economic theory. 
However, this slight increase does not remain for firms below size ten.   22  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
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As discussed in Section 2, different degrees of employment protection can have cones-
quences for the composition of workers. One hypothesis is that the LIFO principle has 
consequences for which workers get laid off. For example, Buhai et al. (2008) addresses 
the question of whether the LIFO increases the bargaining power of the most senior 
workers. If increased bargaining power reduces the risk of being laid off we would 
expect separations among high seniority workers to be less likely in firms above the 
threshold of ten workers, which can not exempt two workers from the LIFO principle. 
Figure 7 shows the share of separations by firm size, separately for workers with more 
than 48 months of seniority and with less than 48 months of seniority, respectively.
8 
According to Figure 7 there is no pronounced break in the share separations at the cut-
off, neither for workers with long seniority nor for workers with short seniority. If 
anything, there seems to be a slightly larger share of separations for workers with long 
seniority at firms of size ten.  
                                                 
8 The seniority threshold of 48 months was used because we do not have data further back than to 1995. Looking at 
an individual in January 1999 who as been employed at the same employer since 1995, we know that she has been 
employed for at least 48 months but we do not know if it is longer than that.   24  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
 
Figure 7. Share separations by firm size, before and after the exemption rule, for 
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Moreover, according to the theoretical discussion in Section 2, the exemption rule may 
improve employment prospects for young, older, immigrant and female workers. 
Inspecting separate figures by young (aged 18–25) and old workers (aged 55–64) and 
for female and immigrant
9 workers, results reveal that the exemption rule did not 
change the composition of workers with respect to these characteristics, except that 
there seems to be a small discontinuous break between firm sizes eleven and ten as 
regards separations for older workers (figures for the period when the exemption rule 
was in place are shown in the appendix). The effect of older workers is also likely to be 
related to the finding of an effect on separations for workers with longer seniority since 
age and seniority are positively correlated.  
 
                                                 
9 Immigrants are defined as individuals born outside of the Nordic countries. IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  25 
Taken together, the above graphical analysis indicates that the relaxation of the 
exemption rule for ‘small’ firms did not affect worker flows in any important way. The 
absence of any thresholds effects supports the idea of comparing employment behaviour 
around the threshold. Therefore, we next estimate the statistical effects of the exemption 
on worker flows using the RD approach.  
6  Econometric analysis of worker flows 
6.1  Regression discontinuity analysis 
To estimate the statistical effects of the exemption rule on worker flows we use monthly 
data for the period 2001–02, and base our estimations on the following specification: 
 
(3) y imt = α + f(Firm sizeimt) + δI[Firm sizeimt ≤ 10] + λm + γt + εimt, 
 
where yimt is one of the worker flow measures (absolute employment change, share new 
hires and share separations) for establishment i in month m and year t, f(Firm size)  is 
some polynomial function of firm size and I[Firm size ≤ 10]  is an indicator variable 
taking the value 1 if a firm has ten or fewer workers (0, otherwise), and δ is the causal 
effect of the relaxation of the LIFO principle provided that the function f(Firm size) 
adequately fits the smooth relationship between the outcome measure and firm size. All 
month and year effects are represented by the parameters λm and γt, respectively.   
Since we have the population of Swedish firms, implying a huge number of 
observations, we can simply estimate whether there are any significant difference in the 
outcome measure between firms of size ten and eleven. We can also increase the firm 
size bandwidth and include firms of size nine and twelve and also eight and thirteen. In 
order to estimate a potential discontinuous break between firms of size ten and eleven 
when we increase the bandwidth we have to control for the general relationship between 
firm sizes and the outcome measure of interest. In the results reported we include a 
linear and a squared term of firm size but results are insensitive to higher order of firm 
size polynomials. Since firms are observed repeatedly over the year, standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. 26  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
Results from estimations of the exemption rule on the worker flow measures, using 
different firm size bandwidths, are reported in Table 2. As regards the absolute 
employment change and the share of new hires, results do not show any significant 
effects of the exemption rule. For the share of separations, the only significant effect – 
at the 10 percent significance level – is obtained when firms of sizes 9–12 are used in 
the estimation (see column 2). This is consistent with the pattern found in Figure 6 and 
in accordance with what theory would predict about a less restrictive employment 
protection. However, the estimated coefficient of 0.0016 implies an estimated increase 
in the share of separations of 0.16 percentage points. Considering that the average share 
of separations for firms of size ten is 4.5 percent this amounts to an estimated increase 
of 3.5 percent. One might argue that this is a non-significant effect in economic terms, 
and that we have estimated a very precise effect due to a very larger number of 
observations. This brings us to the question of how calculate the correct standard errors 
due to potentially correlated errors within certain groups.   
Table 2. Regression discontinuity estimates with different firm size windows  
 Firms  sizes 







0.0009   
(0.0008) 
 
















0.0006   
 (0.0006) 
Observations
   204,602 416,679  647,019 
Estimations include month dummies and a year dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.    
Three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% level; two asterisks for the 5% level, and one 
asterisk for the 10% level. When the employment change measure is used, the number of observations is 
slightly lower since the measure is based on a time difference (for column 1 it is: 204,144; column 2: 
415,708; column 3: 645,488). 
 
The consequence of not taking into account correlated errors within certain groups is 
that standard errors are likely to be downward biased. Since all estimates, except for the 
share of separations in column 2, are insignificant this issue is perhaps irrelevant. Any-
way, we will we check what happens with the effect on share separations if we account 
for correlated errors within firm size. This is equivalent to relying on aggregated data on IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  27 




(4)   [ ] s s + s s ε + s = size I δ = y y 1 − , 
 
where  s y  is the share of separations for firms of size s, I[size=s] is an indicator variable 
taking the value 1 if firm size is s (0 otherwise), and  s δ captures the immediate jump in 
employment change between firms of sizes s and s+1. This setup means that when we 
examine whether there is a discontinuous break between firms of size ten and eleven, s 
is equal to ten. Since we can estimate eighteen such changes of y, one for each 
difference between adjacent firm sizes, we can check whether the estimated effect 
between firms with ten and eleven employees is likely to be drawn from a different 
distribution in contrast to all other estimated differences between adjacent firm sizes. 
All estimations are robust to any form of correlated errors with each firm size (such as 
correlations between industries and regions within the same size level). Note that we 
only use post-reform data (the years 2001 and 2002) in these estimations. 
Figure 8 shows the estimated differences between adjacent firm sizes, with corre-
sponding 90 percent confidence intervals, for the share of separations (we use 90 
percent confidence intervals here since the corresponding effect reported in Table 2 was 
only significant the 10 percent significance level) . The estimated difference between 
sizes ten and eleven is positive and somewhat more positive than other estimated differ-
ences between adjacent firm sizes around the neighbourhood of firm sizes (say 8–12). 
More importantly, however, the estimated 90 percent confidence interval contains the 
zero, implying that the effect is not significantly different from zero.
10  
                                                 
10 We have also performed an analogous analysis for the absolute employment change and the share of new hires and 
all effects are found to be insignificant. 28  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
Figure 8. Estimated RD effects of the exemption rule on share separations between 











































Since the graphical analysis shows a tendency of an effect for older workers and 
workers with longer seniority, we turn to estimations of heterogeneous effects. Results 
are presented in Table 3. The only effects significant at the 1 percent level are effects on 
the share of separations for older workers and workers with longer seniority. For older 
workers this turns out to be the case when firm sizes ten and eleven are included. The 
increase in the share separations for older workers is 0.04 percentage points. Since the 
share separations for older workers is about 0.75 percent this amounts to a 5 percent 
increase in separations due to the exemption rule. 
As regards seniority of at least 48 months, this holds when firm sizes 9–12 are used. 
Standard errors reported in Table 3 are robust to errors correlated within firms. If we 
take into account correlated errors within firms size by estimating equation (4), the 
estimated difference in separations between firm size ten and eleven is not significant 
anymore, neither when considering older workers nor for workers with longer seniority IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  29 
– the estimated 95 percent confidence intervals contain the zeros (results are available 
from the authors). For both groups of workers the estimated differences in the share of 
separations between firm size ten and eleven are, however, larger than all other esti-
mated differences between adjacent firms sizes (except for the differences between firm 
sizes two and three and between three and four, which are so far from the cut-off of 
value it is difficult to make any inferences from such differences). For this reason, we 
conclude that it can not be completely ruled out that the exemption rule slightly 
increased separations for older workers and workers with longer seniority, even if 
estimates based on equation (4) are not significant. 
Table 3. Regression discontinuity estimates with different firm size windows, separately 
by groups 
 Firm  sizes





Young      






     Share separations  -0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 




Old      






     Share separations  0.0004*** 
(0.0002) 
 




Immigrants      






     Share 




0.00008   
(0.0002) 
0.000004   
 (0.0001) 
Female      






     Share separations  0.0001   
(0.0003) 
0.0005   
(0.0005) 
0.000006  
  (0.0003) 
Seniority ≥ 48 Months      






Seniority < 48 Months      






Observations  204,602 416,679  647,019 
See Table 2.  30  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden 
6.2  Estimations for firms with at least three separations 
The effect on the share of separations has been this far been based on all separations, 
i.e., voluntary as well as involuntary. As discussed in Section 3, we can not separate 
between voluntary, fires and lay offs. Since the exemption rule is only of importance 
when separations are involuntary, it might be the case that voluntary separations 
disguise any effects of the exemption rule on lay offs due to ‘shortage of work’. For this 
reason we have estimated the effect of the exemption rule on the share of separations for 
the subsample of firm-months with at least three separations (around 3 percent of the 
total sample). For these firms it is likely that a substantial amount of the separations are 
involuntary. Figure 9 shows the average share of separations by firm size for firms with 
at least three separations. We also estimated the effects of the relaxation of the LIFO 
principle using this subpopulation sample relying on equations (3) and (4). According to 
our results, no effects are significant.
11 
                                                 
11 We also used the same subpopulation sample and estimated effects for different worker compositions i.e., on older 
workers aged 55–64, workers aged 18–25, female workers, for immigrant workers and for workers with different 
seniority levels. No effects are significant at any conventional significance levels. We have also performed an 
analogous analysis for the share of hires but no effects appear significantly different from zero. Results are available 
from the authors.   IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  31 
Figure 9. Share separations by firm size for firm-months with at least three separations, 
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If might be the case that three separations per firm and month do not to a larger extent 
capture separations due to shortage of work. It could for example just reflect bad work-
ing conditions. As an alternative analysis we have therefore used observations where the 
difference in the number of separations and hires is at least two. Neither in this case do 
we find a significant effect of the exemption rule.
12  
6.3  Difference in differences analysis 
Using firm-quarterly data as repeated cross-sections for the period 1999–2002, we also 
use the DD approach where a firm is defined as treated if average quarterly firm size is 
ten or below. The estimations are based on the following regression model:  
(5) y iq = α + γDiq + ρAfterq + δDiq×Afterq + λq + εiq, 
                                                 
12 We have also performed an analysis of heterogeneous effect with respect to 59 industries (based on a two-digit 
industry classification). There are no clear-cut results from such an analysis. Only in about 5 percent of the cases do 
we find any significant effects, and sometimes negative effects. It could also be argued that we might have found 
significant effects in 5 percent by chance.  
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where yiq is the outcome measure for firm i in quarter q, Diq is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if the firm has ten or less workers in quarter q, Afterq is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 for the period when the exemption rule was in place (1
st quarter in 
2001 and onwards), and 0 otherwise. Time (quarter) effects are represented by λq. Under 
the assumption that ‘small’ and ‘large’ firms would have parallel outcome trends in 
absence of the exemption rule, δ is the causal effect of the exemption rule.  
The informal way to examine the parallel outcome trend assumption is to inspect the 
development of the outcome measure for the treated and control groups, respectively.  
Figure 10-12 show the quarterly development of absolute employment change, share of 
hires and separations, respectively, for small and large firms. As shown by these figures, 
the two groups seem to have parallel trends in these employment measures before the 
introduction of the exemption rule. The figures also reveal that there is no relative 
increase for small firms in the absolute employment change, new hires nor separations. 
This is also confirmed by the DD estimates from equation (5), reported in  
Table 4, where all estimates are insignificant at the 5 percent significance level. The 
effect on the share of new hires is significant at the 10 percent level but negative, which 
is opposite to what we would expect according to the theoretical prediction. In fact, a 
significant effect at the 10 percent level can hardly be considered as significant since we 
have more the 2 million observations in the estimation. Neither is the effect significant 
in economic terms.
13 DD estimates, separate by groups (young and old, female and 
immigrants), not presented here, are all insignificant. 
                                                 
13 One major concern with the Difference-in-differences approach is the issue of understatement of standard errors as 
recently discussed by Donald and Lang (2007), Bertrand et al. (2004) and Conley and Taber (2007). Difference-in-
differences estimations above ignore potential correlation between firms within the treatment and control groups. One 
way to solve this problem is to rely on the aggregated data as presented in Figures 10–12. Results from fixed-effect 
estimations based on these aggregated data show no significant effects. Results are available from the authors upon 
request.  IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  33 
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Table 4. Difference-in-differences estimates of the 2001 reform in the LIFO principle. 











   (0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
Observations  2,210,490 2,212,247  2,212,247 
Estimations include quarter dummies. Standard error clustered on firm level.    
 
6.4 Heterogeneous  effects  with respect to firm size 
Using the DD approach we can also perform a more careful analysis on how the 
possibility to nominate two employees as ‘key workers’ affects lay-off decisions. As 
discussed in Section 4, the effect of the relaxation of the LIFO principle could 
potentially have different effects depending on the firm size. To examine this we allow 
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where Diqs is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm is of size s (0 otherwise). 
The parameter δs measures how the outcome has changed for a firm of size s relative to 
the reference group of firms (sizes 16–20) after the relaxation of the LIFO principle. 
Provided that all firm sizes have parallel trends in the outcome, δs measures the causal 
effect of the exemption rule.  
We present results using the share of new hires and share of separations as the 
dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered on the firm level.  
Figure 13 shows the estimated coefficients from equation (6) with corresponding 95 
percent confidence intervals when the share of new hires is used as dependent variable. 
Figure 14 shows the corresponding coefficients with the share of separations as the 
dependent variable. As shown in these two figures, there are no significant effects at all 
for any of the firm sizes in the relevant neighbourhood of the cut-off.    
Figure 13. DD estimates of the exemption rule on the share new hires by firm size with 
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Figure 14. DD estimates of the exemption rule on the share of separations by firm size 












































7  Discussion and conclusion 
How employment protection affects firms’ employment behaviour is vital to the design 
of policy and to the understanding of labour market behaviour. This paper empirically 
investigates how employment protection affects firms’ employment behaviour by focus-
ing on a certain aspect to the legislation, namely a seniority rule. Previous empirical 
research often relies on cross-country variation by correlating some strictness index 
measure of employment protection with the employment level. One major challenge 
with cross-country studies is to obtain comparable measures of strictness, since legisla-
tion varies widely across countries. We therefore argue that it is also important to 
evaluate certain aspects of the employment protection legislation such as the seniority 
rule. Seniority rules exist in several countries such as Finland, France, Italy, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US. IFAU – Last in, first out? Estimating the effect of seniority rules in Sweden  37 
In Sweden the seniority rule states that the worker who was employed last has to go first 
when a firm downsizes, i.e., the so-called LIFO principle. This principle has received 
much attention, both from a political and an academic point of view – where opponents 
argue, e.g., that unemployment will result because employers become more reluctant to 
hire new workers. For this reason, the LIFO principle was reformed in January 2001 so 
that employers with ten or fewer employees were allowed to exempt two workers from 
the seniority rule. Using unique data including the population of firms matched with the 
population of workers for the period 1999–2002, the break in the policy for firms of size 
ten provides a natural setting for analysing the impact of the exemption rule using a 
regression discontinuity (RD) approach. 
The paper contributes to the literature on employment protection and employment 
behaviour by focusing on the effect of a seniority rule on firms’ strategic behaviour and 
on workers flows. There is also limited knowledge of how exemption rules for smaller 
firms in the employment protection legislation in general affect employment behaviour. 
Moreover, previous studies often rely on small and unrepresentative data sets, which 
makes it difficult to generalise from results and it is not always clear whether non-
robust results are due to insignificant effects or due to a small number of observations. 
Our results show that the exemption had no effect at all on the size distribution of firms 
and we do not find any general effects on employment fluctuations or on hires and 
separations. The only exceptions is a tendency of an increase in the share of separations 
for older workers aged 55-64 and for workers with longer seniority, but these effects are 
not robust to how standard errors are calculated and the effects are small in economic 
terms. 
The result in this paper is interesting not only because it is the first paper evaluating 
the consequences of the LIFO principle on firms’ employment behaviour, but it also 
points to the importance of considering in detail how legislation is formulated and how 
it works in practice. According to Calleman (2000) and Wilhelmsson (2001), employers 
can to a large extent circumvent the LIFO principle and keep a valuable worker through 
negotiations with the union. When there is shortage of work with respect to certain work 
tasks, the LIFO principle is supposed to hold within a certain clientele of workers 
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possible for the firm and the union to define such a clientele of workers in a very narrow 
way. As such, a worker who is considered as valuable for the firm can be defined as 
belonging to a clientele of workers not affected by the LIFO principle. It is not hard to 
imagine a situation where it is in the union’s interest that a recently hired person stays 
with the firm. Consider a small firm with, say, five workers, exposed to hard compe-
tition and with work shortage with respect to certain work tasks. If the alternative to 
down-sizing is bankruptcy it would be in both the union’s and the firm’s interest to let 
the newly hired person stay if his or her contribution to the firm is extremely valuable. 
In addition, even within a group of workers affected by the principle, an employer may 
keep a worker with shorter seniority, by arguing that this worker is qualified for certain 
work tasks whereas another worker with longer seniority is not. It is then this latter 
worker who will be laid off.
14 Moreover, the share of temporary contracts has increased 
substantially during the last ten-year period. Thus, the employer has the possibility to 
screen new workers for a significant period of time, which makes a hiring less risky.  
Taken together, one interpretation of the findings in this paper is that the seniority 
rule does not matter much since there are ways for the employer to circumvent it.   
                                                 
14 When the employer has not signed any collective agreement and when none of the employees is union member, the 
union has no influence on the employer’s employment decision. In such a case it is possible that the exemption rule 
has no effect at all if the employer makes all employment decisions. If the exemptions were important we would yet 
have found effects since small firms do sign collective agreements even if to a smaller extent than larger firms. This 
issue can not be further investigated in the paper since we do not have information on whether collective agreements 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Share new hires and separations by firm size for young and old during the 
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Figure A2. Share new hires and separations by firm size for immigrants and females 
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